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This paper analyses recent tendencies of managing public real estate and public stake-holdings 
in a sample of Italian municipalities. The data, retrieved from the Italian Ministry of Interior 
(Central Department of Local Finances), has been analysed to understand if the local public 
group, intended in a wider sense and including both subsidiaries and real estate property, is 
changed over time, in terms of size and composition. The first results show that there has not 
been adequate divestment to postulate on a general reduction of the boundaries of the 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This research is aimed at analysing recent 
tendencies concerning ‘local public groups’ with 
specific reference to public stake-holdings in 
companies and local PA’s real estate portfolios. 
In Italy, the phenomenon of public share-
holdings in private companies began in the early 20th 
century. Then, both public intervention and 
investment grew in many economic sectors, 
following the crash of 1929. Such reforms were 
initially aimed at preventing markets from failing. 
However, the system ran into difficulties in the 
1970s, basically because of its copious size and lack 
of efficiency (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). 
The Entrepreneurial PA model had been 
superseded with privatisations during the 1990s, 
also due to new obligations regarding public 
finances imposed by the EU (Maastricht Treaty and 
Stability and Growth Pact). However, divestments of 
public companies have fallen dramatically since 
2000. Indeed, the opposite phenomenon was 
experienced both on a national and local level, as 
enterprises  controlled by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance and by regional, provincial and 
municipal authorities have continuously grown 
(Assonime 2008). This new trend gives local PA’s the 
power to interact strongly, vertically, and 
horizontally with other organisations (Kooiman, 
1999-2000) in a framework of public governance 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
The growing phenomenon of managerial 
models in PA’s induced by New Public Management 
(Hood, 1991-1995-2001; Barzelay, 2001; Kettl, 2000) 
was subject to strong criticism. Pollit (1993) sees it 
as paving the way towards ‘Neo-Taylorism’, whilst 
Lynn (2001) underlines a somewhat excessive 
emphasis on seeking efficiency, flanked by 
administrative principles that recall scientific 
management. Global convergences towards a NPM 
paradigm (Aucoin, 1990; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) 
were subject to reconsiderations and criticism. Many 
scholars converged on the previously mentioned 
known as “Public Governance” (Pierre and Peters, 
2000), or “New public service” (Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000), considering citizens as  the target 
of the PA governance system. Also, some authors 
noted that change is received depends highly on 
each country’s institutional traditions (Wright, 1994). 
In fact, according to their tradition, each country has 
received NPM reforms differently. One of the 
reasons is that  PA perception is different between 
different countries (Van de Walle, 2006). This can 
affect the choice between economic rationality and 
the search for social cohesion. The two ideal 
extremes in such trade-off are Eastern European 
countries, often considered latecomers in the 
application of NPM, and Anglo-saxon countries, that 
are usually considered the forerunners of NPM. 
These latter maintain the idea of a minimal PA 
(Kuhlmann, 2010). Italy is usually considered a 
latecomer, having adopted NPM with delays and 
hesitation. This is also due to its Napoleonic 
traditional administrative culture, which was 
oriented towards a strong role of the State in the 
economy (Kuhlmann, 2010). Some authors (Cepiku e 
Meneguzzo, 2011) compared Italy to Neo-Weberian 
paradigms, analysing how Italy has implemented 
recent reforms and how they differ from NPM. 
These considerations support the neo-
institutional approach to study changes, focusing on 
how institutions and organisations incorporate 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 3, Spring 2016, Continued - 2 
 
 348   
values and power (Hall & Taylor 1996; Lowndes 
1996). 
Given the increasing importance of share-
holdings or controlling interests by local PA’s in 
companies (Unioncamere, 2007; IRPA, 2012), this 
research is focused on the proportions and amounts 
Italian municipalities have invested in thousands of 
companies belonging to different sectors (Corte dei 
Conti, 2014). The companies’ inefficiencies and their 
recurring losses have contributed to expanding the 
public debts, together with the urgency and 
sensitivity of policy-makers to redraw the 
boundaries of the public group (Borgonovi et al., 
2013). This topic is also relevant considering the 
massive cost such companies burden the state with, 
which amounts to approximately € 26 million for 
2013, consisting of all the payments the ministries 
paid to the companies owned by the public sector 
(Corte dei Conti, 2014). 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This research analyses how local authorities manage 
their share-holdings and real estate portfolio.  
considering the privatization practises (Anselmi, 
2014), divestments, and new investments in 
subsidiaries and real estate recently performed by 
Italian local authorities.  
This wider perspective is necessary given the 
complexity of local public group. In local public 
groups, collaboration and interaction with private 
entities (connected to the PA with different levels of 
formal agreements) can lead to greater flexibility 
and to increase the efficiency in addressing 
stakeholders’ demands (Hrytsenko, 2012). In order 
to analyse public policy’s results properly, we also 
need to step back to see the full picture and how the 
boundaries of the State changed (Bevir et al, 2003) 
even at the local level. 
Thus, we believe that a comprehensive 
approach to the changes in the local integrated 
public group could include both the stakes held by 
local administrations and the real estate. By “local 
integrated public group”, we mean both the stakes 
held by local administrations in companies or other 
entities and the real estate portfolio of local 
authorities. 
In fact, when evaluating an institution’s 
objectives and range of influence, both the amounts 
invested in stake-holdings and the real estate 
portfolio should be considered. 
A peculiar aspect of local authorities’ real 
estate portfolio is the ‘illiquid’ tendency (meaning 
the customary habit of divesting assets in a long-
term) and the ‘heterogeneous’ nature of investments 
even from a financial standpoint. 
The patrimonial consistency, both in terms of 
financial participation (stake-holdings in companies 
involved in managing public services), as well as real 
estate assets (disposable and non-disposable assets) 
is measurable for each local authority in the specific 
section of their financial statement. 
This paper is aimed at verifying whether local 
authorities reduced their amounts of financial 
participations and real estate assets. Therefore, we 
will consider both the trend of investments and 
stakes in companies and the amounts invested in 
real estate. Further considerations will follow for 
financial problems in local authorities, considering 
indexes of structural deficiency. 
Specifically, Research Questions (RQ) will cover 
two main areas: 
 
RQ1: How has investments’ consistency by local 
authorities trended? 
RQ1.1: How has the relation between 
disposable and non-disposable assets been 
affected? Is there a ‘compensation’ effect 
between these two aggregates? 
 
RQ2: How have the boundaries of local 
“integrated” public groups changed, jointly 
considering investments in real estate as well as 
stake-holdings? 
The importance of such questions is further 
supported by political and institutional debate, 
formalised in specific documents such as the 
Document of Economics and Finance, approved by 
the Government on 8 April 2014, which reintroduced 
the theme of privatisation and foresaw the reduction 
of public intervention on both national and local 
levels. Moreover, there have been numerous 
attempts at making a spending review, introduced 
with the Budget Law for 2007 and confirmed by 
Budget Law for 2008 (MEF, 2007).  Legislative Decree 
#78 of 2010 was also aimed at reducing share-
holdings of small and medium-small sized 
municipalities. 
With the intention of rationalising expenditure, 
the practice of linear clean cuts needs to be 
overcome and replaced by different solutions that 
increase public efficiency, based on leaner business 
models that have longer-term sustainability, heading 
to a model where regulations are enforced by 
specific Authorities. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
This research belongs to the research field which 
investigate the trends in state-participated 
companies and in local authorities’ real estate 
portfolio. One of its aims is to ascertain whether 
there is a relation between divestment in companies, 
deficits in the finances of local authorities, and the 
real estate management. Therefore, we intend to 
verify whether the areas covered by local public 
groups are being reduced in terms of divestment in 
stake-holdings and in real estate, especially where 
those municipalities are running at a loss. 
This paper elaborates on these areas from an 
analytical-descriptive viewpoint, combining different 
dimensions through meta-data and secondary data 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003), multiple 
research methods (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 
2007) and concentrating on the elaboration of data  
through descriptive statistics. The sample of 
municipalities is composed of 20 Italian regional 
capital cities. This choice gives a representative idea 
of the 20 regions Italy is made up of. Moreover, 
regional capitals are larger and more complex than 
smaller cities, which provides an idea of how greater 
difficulties are managed. 
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Table 1. Description of the sample: the 20 Italian regional capital cities 
 
Sample: 20 Italian regional capital cities 
Ancona Campobasso Milan Rome 
Aosta Catanzaro Naples Trento 
Bari Florence Palermo Trieste 
Bologna Genoa Perugia Turin 
Cagliari L'Aquila Potenza Venice 
 
For each municipality specific financial 
statement items were considered, based on the data 
provided by the Ministry of Interior (Central 
Department of Local Finance). Specifically, data was 
collected for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012. The 
need to study approved financial statements has 
given on one hand reliable official data from the 
Ministry of Interior, but on the other has not made it 
possible to analyse more recent data. 
The following table illustrates the data 
collected, divided into macro-areas, subsections, and 
singular items. 
 
Table 2. Description of data collected 
 
Macro-area Sub-section Item 
Revenue 
Income from sale, capital transfers, or 
collection of credit 
Sale of real estate and building rights on real 
estate assets 
Capital Expenditure Liabilities 
Acquisition of real estate assets 
Stake-holdings 
Transfer of capital 
Details of expenditure in capital account 
for the acquisition of real estate assets 
- 
Acquisition of buildings 
Acquisition of land 
Building and maintenance of tendered works 
Total 
Consistency, initiation and 
reimbursement of loans to institution 







Debt towards controlled companies 
Connected companies 
Management of residual liabilities and 
total accruals at year end 
Sources of financing initiated for the 
interventions reported in the annual list of 
public works 
Transfer of Real Estate Assets 
Total 
 
The financial information was then integrated with 
the resident population’s data for each municipality 
as at 2012 (source: Ministry of Interior). 
Most of the data was analysed using descriptive 




In this paragraph we present the data collected and 
elaborated in order to try to sketch a first answers 
to the research questions. 
 
   :                   ’             b                      ended? 
 
Table 3. Average aggregated assets value 
 
 Average 2010 Average 2011 Average 2012 % 2010-2012 
A) Assets (total) 2.787.425.069,25 2.896.855.347,85 2.973.193.040,03 6,66% 
Intangible assets 3.917.302,85 3.463.318,00 3.147.733,74 -19,65% 
Tangible assets -Of which: 2.308.746.136,80 2.437.033.002,95 2.532.637.900,35 9,70% 
1. State-owned goods 453.475.857,00 483.645.110,35 516.222.188,60 13,84% 
2. Land (non-disposable assets) 55.155.468,60 58.796.674,45 59.563.959,61 7,99% 
3. Land (disposable assets) 13.717.627,15 12.423.998,65 12.694.682,92 -7,46% 
4. Buildings (non-disposable assets) 755.704.218,55 719.502.079,90 748.371.379,11 -0,97% 
5. Buildings (disposable assets) 77.505.743,95 98.153.418,10 102.182.076,54 31,84% 
 
To ascertain the amount of fixed assets, we 
collected and analysed data in different sections, 
firstly considering tangible and intangible assets. 
The total assets (tangible and intangible) for 2012 
was an average of € 2,973,193,040.03 (totalling € 
59,463,860,800.52). This was an increase of 6.66% (+ 
€ 185,767,970.77) from the initial amount at the 
start of the study in 2010.  
This increase can be partly explained by 
breaking the numbers down into their components. 
Concerning intangible assets, there was a decrease 
over the three-year period: from € 3,918,302.85 to  € 
3,147,733.74 between 2010 and 2012. This amounts 
to a reduction of 19.65% (- € 769,569.11). This was 
compensated by increasing tangible assets: a 9.7% 
increase from 2010 to 2012 (+ € 223,891,763.55).  
The dynamics of tangible assets can be 
explained in the financial statements of the local 
authorities by five items: state-owned property (non-
disposable), land (non-disposable assets), land 
(disposable assets), buildings (non-disposable 
assets), and buildings (disposable assets). Data was 
initially analysed collectively, to identify a trend, and 
then each municipality was taken into separate 
consideration, to ascertain the presence of any 
variances between non-disposable and disposable 
assets. 
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State-owned property increased in value from € 
453,475,857.00 to € 516,222,188.60 (+13.84% or € 
62,746,331.60), land relating to non-disposable 
assets jumped from € 55,155,468.40 to € 
59,563,959.61 increasing by 7.99% (+ € 
4,408,491.01). On the other hand land disposable 
assets dropped from € 13,717,627.15 to € 
12,695,682.92 over the period (-7.46% or - € 
1,022,944.23). 
 




Regarding buildings, the non-disposable assets 
for each municipality in consideration decreased 
collectively by 0.97% in the three-year period (from € 
755,704,218.55 to € 748,371,379.11 for a variation 
of - € 7,332,839.44); building disposable assets, on 
the other hand experienced a different trend 
jumping 31.84% (from € 77,505,743.95 to € 
102,182,076.54 and a difference of + € 
24,676,332.59). 
The research focused, then, on variations in 
total fixed assets for each municipality. In this initial 
stage, aspects such as differences between tangible 
or intangible assets were not taken into 
consideration. First results clearly show that 13 out 
of the 20 municipalities in consideration had 
steadily increased their fixed assets in the last 3 
years. Four had alternating trends, and three (Turin, 
Bologna and Cagliari) had continuously reduced 
their fixed assets. 
 




About the “Source of financing for public works 
from the annual plan” (source: database of Italian 
Ministry of Interior), the data regarding “Sale of 
fixed assets carried out” has been related to the 
“total” amounts from sources of financing.  
The aim was to understand how much of the 
local authority’s fixed assets has been sold to 
finance the construction of new public works.  
Other forms of financing (not considered in 
this analysis) that is possible to activate to realize 
the public works listed in the annual plan, are, for 
instance: mortgaging, “income from building 
permits”, “contributions from public service bodies”, 
“income from transfers of private capital”, 
“administrative profit”, “revenue from finances 
other than contributions”, and “other forms of 
financing”. Data was analysed both by year and by 
individual municipality. The ratio gives 4.78% in 
2010, 5.4% in 2011, and 5.36% in 2012. On average, a 
relatively low amount (5.18%) of new public works 
are financed by sale of fixed assets.  
However, there are some exceptions to the 
average in the cases of Bologna, Florence, Perugia, 
and Ancona, whose percentages were above a 10% 
ratio (reaching an average 17% for the three-year 
period in Ancona). 
 
y = 1E+07x + 8E+07 
R² = 0,881 
Non-disposable assets (average) disposable assets (average)
2011-2010 trend 2012-2011 trend
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Table 6. Sale carried out and source of financing for public works for each municipality; 2010-2012 
 
Municipalities 
Sale of assets carried out 
Total source of financing for public works (from the 
annual plan of public works) 
2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 
Aosta 0 0 0 0 0 232.071 
Turin 150.000 0 0 43.917.691 70.575.969 65.260.111 
Genoa 956.180 0 0 117.392.070 88.192.223 2.791.846 
Milan 857.600 16.406.706 6.500.000 596.780.364 387.397.956 260.943.495 
Trento 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Venice 555.000 850.000 310.500 44.001.464 57.451.550 51.675.268 
Trieste 2.179.534 4.186.980 2.967.616 53.626.942 33.503.246 31.217.143 
Bologna 6.545.645 7.188.784 568.052 58.768.763 34.671.898 6.329.578 
Florence 12.925.752 3.839.193 1.030.879 70.106.098 47.499.157 22.269.564 
Perugia 1.096.110 492.296 135.730 8.431.762 10.329.896 426.930 
Ancona 1.454.897 2.268.704 1.738.179 12.162.700 13.785.702 6.925.753 
Rome 14.581.114 50.375.955 22.250.109 574.553.855 1.157.447.010 1.598.576.180 
L'Aquila 650.565 39.000 350.000 17.197.330 181.564.555 3.350.000 
Campobasso 0 0 0 3.925.062 3.510.600 1.871.086 
Naples 0 0 0 91.704.484 7.760.000 9.128.257 
Bari 101.000 444.124 292.500 40.415.690 27.867.408 22.763.420 
Potenza 0 0 0 10.508.256 14.251.677 28.026.602 
Catanzaro 196.299 1.142.162 102.655 43.110.781 16.486.480 34.437.298 
Palermo 0 0 0 0 11.712.845 0 
Cagliari 2.632.581 3.753.052 0 20.173.410 23.404.834 1.018.891 
 
The analysis also focused on ascertaining the 
presence of an opposing trend between the 
variations of disposable and non-disposable assets 
for each municipality. 
RQ1.1: How has the relation between disposable 
and non-disposable assets been affected? Is there a 
‘compensation’ effect between these two aggregates? 
The research attempted to ascertain whether 
there were any relations between disposable and 
non-disposable assets, in order to identify any 
compensatory phenomena between the two that 
might exist. The opposing variations for each 
municipality were recorded for the two periods 
(2010-2011 and 2011-2012).  
For the 20 municipalities in the 2010-2011 
period, the analysis showed in 7 cases an opposing 
trend in the variation of disposable and non-
disposable assets, but these variations do not have a 
significant compensatory effect (no data available 
for the municipality of Aosta).  
About the, the research aimed also to deepen 
the internal sub-division of the category “fixed 
assets” on Land and Buildings, trying to understand 
whether there were any relations between disposable 
and non-disposable assets specifically for land and 
buildings. 
For the 20 municipalities in the 2010-2011 
period, opposing variations between disposable and 
non-disposable land were 7, while there were only 5 
for the same item in 2011-2012. Summarily, as far as 
land is concerned, on 40 observations (20 
municipalities times two periods), the analysis 
showed 12 cases of an opposing trend. Despite this, 
these variations do not have a compensatory effect.  
However, an increase in value for non-
disposable assets for land emerged: 13 
municipalities witnessed a rise. Only Ancona was 
subject to a constant reduction in non-disposable 
assets for land for the period in question. Lastly, the 
remaining three municipalities had alternating 
trends. 
Regarding variations in land disposable assets, 
it is harder to identify a univocal trend. Indeed, six 
municipalities have constantly reduced their assets, 
six have constantly increased them (sometimes in 
very small quantities), while seven municipalities 
have had alternating trends throughout the three-
years period. 
Regarding buildings, there was no clear trend 
regarding how non-disposable assets were managed. 
Eight municipalities constantly reduced their non-
disposable assets for buildings, while a mere three 
had continuously increased. Other eight had 
alternating trends. 
Regarding disposable fixed assets such as 
buildings, however, nine municipalities show that 
they have reduced their portfolio during the three-
year period in question. Five municipalities, on the 
other hand have progressively increased, while a 
further five have had an alternating administration. 
About divestment/acquisition of disposable 
and non-disposable building assets, in the 2011-
2010 period, there were three municipalities that 
had decreasing values for disposable and non-
disposable building assets, while there were ten in 
the 2012-2011 period. Similarly for assets relating to 
land, out of 40 observations regarding buildings in 
the two time periods only 13 showed a drop. 
However, these variations between disposable and 
non-disposable building assets don’t compensate 
each other in each municipality. 
Before analysing the trends between real estate 
assets and stake-holdings in the sample 
municipalities, it is important to recall some 
premises from the previous research question. 
Firstly, graphs 11 and 12 show a descriptive 
statistical analysis regarding the variations in fixed 
assets. 
Different tendencies arise from stake-holdings 
analysis. Only five municipalities have increased 
their stake-holdings over the three-year period, while 
seven have reduced them. Six municipalities have 
had alternating trends in the same three-year period. 
The three municipalities that had constantly reduced 
their real estate assets in the previous analysis, had 
similar behaviour for stake-holdings: two out of 
three (Turin and Cagliari) had decreased stake-
holdings throughout the three years, while Bologna 
had had a reduction in 2010-2011, that was 
significantly countered in 2011-2012. 
We also compared variations between fixed 
assets (excluding stake-holdings) and stake-holdings 
(total) for the three-year period. 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 13, Issue 3, Spring 2016, Continued - 2 
 
 351   
Table 7. Non-disposable and disposable assets variation for each municipality; 2010-2012 
 
Municipality non-disposable assets variation disposable assets variation 
Aosta 0 0 
Turin -49.548.821 -396.063.283 
Genoa 26.707.875 -732.952.812 
Milan 47.486.152 252.140.784 
Trento 33.602 2.635.158 
Venice -16.467.104 -40.164.062 
Trieste -11.592.777 -3.631.455 
Bologna 2.688.814 -75.010.937 
Florence -5.306.510 3.226.648 
Perugia -2.920.967 813.833 
Ancona 24.739.449 -64.856.217 
Rome -6.587.914 -106.543.087 
L'Aquila -2.743.179 699.414.728 
Campobasso -498.326 74.441 
Naples 455.505.739 452.222.851 
Bari 7.171.823 293.719 
Potenza 2.297.902 40.678.146 
Catanzaro -3.977.643 -4.323.138 
Palermo -185.029 -87.654.082 
Cagliari 6.264.682 1.211.797 
 
Table 8. Fixed assets (except financial assets) and financial assets variation for each municipality; 2011-2010 
and 2012-2011. 
 
  Fixed assets (total except financial assets) Financial assets (total) 
Colonna1 Variation 2011-2010 Variation 2012-2011 Variation 2011-20102 variation 2012-20113 
Aosta 4.876.756,00 3.099.182,35 3.350.000,00 0,00 
Turin -3.604.241,00 -87.167.573,73 -102.179.737,00 -25.319.159,53 
Genoa 627.118.916,00 -1.151.359.814,84 -268.556,00 -128.550.318,21 
Milan 471.702.949,00 463.745.030,51 40.282.182,00 61.834.865,70 
Trento 27.256.108,00 21.776.756,34 0,00 -491.671,67 
Venice 74.966.948,00 50.853.961,04 -8.631.263,00 -10.057.145,20 
Trieste -2.771.680,00 32.478.032,97 79.910,00 -1.063,42 
Bologna -31.710.029,00 -40.444.601,80 -200.000,00 11.649.203,66 
Florence 60.041.766,00 21.200.224,68 5.491.225,00 6.389.176,83 
Perugia 2.335.859,00 2.019.668,07 -6.241,00 -2.884,91 
Ancona 20.233.295,00 657.658,27 -283.615,00 27.556,44 
Rome 71.126.523,00 1.138.428.644,86 103.834.860,00 -237.307.018,45 
L'Aquila -3.838.044,00 750.095.881,30 106.886,00 3.966.067,50 
Campobasso -76.991,00 787.320,79 -50.000,00 -0,18 
Naples 734.021.432,00 631.263.243,00 1.632.423,00 -18.854.254,00 
Bari -4.328.680,00 19.869.859,30 6.568.083,00 -1.114.899,15 
Potenza 428.712,00 7.000.118,44 2.640.624,00 35.957,31 
Catanzaro 13.091.934,00 10.728.369,06 0,00 -5.132.432,09 
Palermo 98.044.550,00 6.001.647,09 -852.247,00 -3.958.610,56 
Cagliari -21.825.045,00 -6.936.053,15 0,00 -457.081,10 
 
RQ2: How have the boundaries of local 
“integrated” public groups changed, jointly 
considering investments in real estate as well as 
stake-holdings?  
We performed this analysis using the same 
criteria adopted to observe the trends between 
disposable and non-disposable assets. The purpose 
was to understand whether there were any trends 
between reducing real estate and other fixed assets 
and divestment of stake-holdings (financial assets). 
Similar variations between fixed assets 
(excluding stake-holdings) and stake-holdings (total) 
in the 2010-2011 period were 12 (Aosta, Turin, 
Milan, Trento, Bologna, Florence, Rome, 
Campobasso, Naples, Potenza, Catanzaro), while 
there were nine in the 2011-2012 period Aosta, 
Turin, Genoa, Milan, Florence, Ancona, L’Aquila, 
Potenza, Cagliari). Despite this, whilst finding similar 
trends for the two periods, when analysing the 
period as a whole, only six municipalities follow the 
same trend regarding fixed assets (non-financial) 
and stake-holdings. 
Of these six, four tend to increase their 
“integrated” public group, while only two tend to be 
reducing. The results don’t reveal any significant 
trend concerning increases or reductions to real 
estate assets and stake-holdings: therefore there are 
no clear evidences supporting a strong will to reduce 
the boundaries of the “integrated” local group, even 
if this would be the trend to pursue according to 




Overall, the results shown in previous paragraphs 
detail a poor propensity to divest stake-holdings, 
notwithstanding the urges to do so from ongoing 
legislation and regulatory bodies (see Law 244/2007, 
aimed at eliminating from the boundaries of local 
public groups those “companies whose purpose is to 
produce goods and services not strictly necessary 
for the pursuing institutional goals”).  
However, when thinking on how to implement 
effective spending review processes, such reforms 
should be deeply linked to the redefinition of the 
boundaries of public groups (local and non). Also, an 
appropriate distribution of competences and 
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responsibilities for each level of governance and an 
identification and prioritization of the objectives of 
public administration are essential for creating 
sustainable collective welfare model. 
The first question of the research was aimed at 
ascertaining any relation or opposing trend between 
disposable and non-disposable assets for both land 
and buildings. Generally speaking, for the periods 
2010-2011 and 2011-2012, a slight variation for 
land, shows there might be a compensatory 
phenomenon between the two items. However, the 
variations show that the two do not compensate 
each other perfectly. We looked for similar trends in 
buildings. In the three-year period total amounts did 
not vary far from the variations to land, showing 
less movements possibly due to compensations. On 
the whole, it is not possible to maintain a 
compensatory phenomenon between disposable and 
non-disposable assets for land or buildings. 
The second question was aimed at establishing 
the development of “integrated” local public group 
boundaries, considering the trends of real estate 
assets and stake-holdings in local institutions. We 
compared real estate assets (excluding stake-
holdings) and (total) stake-holdings, to ascertain 
whether there were any parallelisms in the 
divestment or increase in integrated local groups. 
On the whole, there was no clear trend of a 
reduction in integrated local public groups: in most 
cases the municipalities have not followed a unique 
strategy of increasing or decreasing their boundaries 
in terms of stake-holdings or real estate assets. 
Amongst the sample, only two municipalities 
(Turin and Cagliari) have constantly reduced both 
stake-holdings and real estate assets throughout the 
period. Again, this shows a low propensity to reduce 
the boundaries of the local public group. 
 
6. LIMITS OF RESEARCH AND FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The results of this research, instead of showing clear 
trends of either acquisition or divestment, 
highlighted how larger municipalities behave 
differently in Italy (Milan, Roma, and Naples in 
particular, but also Turin and Genoa), compared to 
other regional capitals that have less significant 
variations in their real estate assets and stake-
holdings. 
There are two possible roads ahead for future 
research. The first one could focus the  attention on 
specific case-studies, using a wide range of 
quantitative and qualitative data. This would mean 
that future research would be on a narrower range 
of cities, specifically those hereinbefore mentioned, 
for a deeper analysis possibly over a wider time 
frame. Alternatively, future research could include a 
wider sample of cities, for example considering 
those with more than 60,000 inhabitants, to 
understand the difficulties regarding institutional 
financing. These developments could help to put the 
premises to draft a roadmap for redefining 
integrated local public group boundaries. It could be 
interesting to understand what are the most 
important factors driving the changes, if 
endogenous factors are prevalent (tied to strategic 
choices or contingencies due to lack of resources), or 
whether divestment of real estate assets and stake-
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